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The "State"of Private Networks: The Emerging
Legal Regime of Polycorporatism in Germany
Gunther Teubner*
In the elections for the work council of Daimler Benz AG, a
large corporate group in Germany, the powerful industrial
union, IG-Metall, experienced problems with an internal
opposition group. After a long fight between the majority and
the minority, the union established an election list that
excluded any candidate from the minority group. The minority
group then formed a "rainbow coalition" that united union
members and non-members. Politically, the coalition united the
radical reformist, feminist, anti-discriminatory, and ecological
movements and challenged the union's course of close unionmanagement cooperation. The rainbow-coalition won the
majority of the work council seats in the elections. However,
because the union considered any candidacy on a competing
election list damaging to its interests, it proceeded to expel the
rainbow coalition's leading members.
This case is paradigmatic of some of the recent
developments in the German law of private associations. Like a
magnifymg glass, the case accentuates a number of crucial
legal issues: (1) autonomy of labor unions and other
intermediary associations against state and court interference;
(2) constitutional rights for organizations, especially in the field
of collective bargaining1; (3) right to access intermediary
associations, from any sector of society and for every member of
this sector; (4)judicial review of internal rule production within
the intermediary association; (5) protection of individual rights
of membership against the intermediary associations,
particularly protection against expulsion; (6) minimal legal
requirements for internal democracy in intermediary
* Professor of law at European University Institute, Firenze, and London
School of Economics.
1. GRUNDGESER[Constitution] [GG]art. 9, pt. 111 & 19, pt. 111 (F.R.G.).
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associations; and (7) public responsibility of private
organizations (Gemeinwohl-verpflichtung).
My main argument is that the courts decide these
questions according to a theory of associations internal to the
law. Over time, legal discourse develops an internal theory
about the position of private associations in politics and society.
In fact, how the law regulates the internal affairs of
associations depends on major historical shifts in the meaning
of the public-private distinction. The "public" status of "private"
associations means different things in different historical
periods. In post-war German history, three ideal-typical
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s c a n be d i s t i n g u i s h e d : p l u r a l i s m ,
macrocorporatism, and polycorporatism. Presently, it appears
that while older pluralist arrangements have been replaced by
more recent neocorporatist arrangements, a new shift is taking
place within neocorporatism. Macrocorporatist arrangements
are being superseded by a new political arrangement between
the state and numerous private associations--one which I call
"polycorporatist." In particular, a relationship exists between
the new polycorporatist political arrangement, the legal
perception of a public status of private associations, and the
legal rules governing their external status and internal
structures. This relationship has repercussions for all seven
legal issues that are emerging in the rainbow-coalition case.

"Invoking civil society" is the suggestive title of a n article
by Charles Taylor in which he discusses the public status of
intermediary association^.^ The ideas Taylor develops in the
broader framework of political theory may be helpful in
revising traditional legal perceptions of private associations.
Taylor argues that a web of autonomous associations,
independent of the state, is the core institution of civil society.
And yet, because two competing models of civil society exist, it
is unclear what invoking civil society actually means. In the
tradition of Montesquieu (what Taylor calls the "M-stream"),
civil society means political society. However, while civil society
in the M-stream develops within the political process, it is

2.
Charles Taylor, Invoking Civil Society, in WORKING PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CENTERFOR PSYCHOSOCIAL
STUDIES
1-17 (G. Urban & B. Lee
eds., 1990).
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crucial that i t maintain its autonomy against state institutions.
Of particular importance is the autonomy of intermediary
association^.^ Intermediary associations are constitutionally
diverse, distributing power among many independent sources.
The tradition of Locke (what Taylor calls the "Lstream")
works on different assumptions. In the L-stream, civil society is
pre-political society, a self-organizing, extra-political reality. In
civil society, the social defends its autonomy against the
political. (Adam Smith and Karl Marx's works evince this
conception.) Civil society is not limited to the economy, but
extends especially to things "public," and more generally to
"civilization."
Hegel attempted a synthesis integrating both L-stream and
M-stream traditions in the idea of the overarching State.
However, in retrospect, this turned out to be a great historical
error. Therefore, which interpretation of civil society, Taylor
asks, is valid under (post)modern conditions? In this context,
he discusses neocorporatist arrangements in Germany and
Japan as well as critiques of them from the right and the left.
The question also arises whether we are presently experiencing
a new dominance of the Gstream or whether we can foresee a
new balance between L-stream and M-stream traditions?
From this perspective, the communitarianism versus
individualism dichotomy seems to present misleading
alternatives. I t presupposes a simplified image of society as a
hierarchical relationship between individuals a n d a n
overarching "state," with intermediary organizations lying
somewhere in between. In this conceptual framework,
intermediary associations "mediate" vertically individual needs
and collective goals. Consequently, their orientation oscillates
between individualist and communitarian concerns. However,
as suggestive as this image might be, i t would result in
misleading public policies and legal regulations. The "public
status" of intermediary associations would take on a rather
impoverished meaning. The image would characterize
intermediary organizations as the main link between individual
interests and the state's interests. And, as a result, the
concomitant idea of intra-organizational democracy would
likely end in simple requests for more citizen participation in
3.
See generally SEYMOURM. LIPSET,POLITICALI+Wt TIIE SOCIAL
BASES OF
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA
(Phillips Bradley
PoLIT1cs (1960); ALEXIS DE 'I~CQUEVILLE,
ed. & Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1972).
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public affairs within the associations.
Indeed, the contemporary discussion on intermediary
associations h a s usually taken place within these
a s ~ u m ~ t i o nHowever,
s.~
if Taylor is correct in viewing modern
civil society as a new combination of Estream and M-stream
conceptions, then the hierarchical model is plainly inadequate.
It cannot cope with the contemporary reality of a fragmented
society. The differentiation of specialized discourses within
society precludes a simple hierarchical model of rulers and
ruled; for politics itself has become decentered. In fact, politics
is no longer the central instance of society, but only one among
many discourses. Different lines of thought about modern
society converge on this important point. A general discourse
on society is, more than ever before, confronted with a
"dissociation of its rule system^,"^ a multitude "of languagegame^,"^ and a plurality of "semiotic groups."' Sociologists
characterize modernity as the "separation of spheresr8 the
differentiation of the "subsystems of ~ociety,"~
the "operational
and the plurality of "forms of
closure of autopoie~is,"~~
discourse and negotiation."" In this view of modern society,
the hierarchy of state versus individual is irreversibly replaced
by the heterarchy of different spheres of society.
In a society thus fragmented, intermediary associations
play a different role. Their main activity is not to mediate
"vertically" between rulers and ruled in a manner comparable
to the estates of the ancient regime. Rather, their new role is to
mediate '%orizontally" between the autonomous logics of
different social discourses. Intermediary associations mediate

4.
LIPSET, supra note 3; THOMASH. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP,
AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
(1964); Johan P. Olsen, Integrated Organizational
Participation in Government, in HANDBOOK
OF ORGANIZATIONAL
DESIGN 492,
492-516 (Paul C. Nystrom & William H. Starbuck eds., 1981).
5.
JEAN-FRANCOIS
LYOTARD,THE DIFFBREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 12
@Ianchester: Manchester University Press 1987).
PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS
23-24 (Oxford:
6.
LUDWIGWITTGENSTEIN,
Blackwell 1989).
7.
BERNARD
S. JACKSON,
COHERENCE
133 et seq.
LAW,FACTAND NARRATIVE
(Liverpool: Deborah Charles 1988).
PHILIP SELZNICK,
MORALCOMMONWEALTH:
SOCIAL WORY AND THE
8.
PROMISEOF COMMUNITY 4 et seq. (1992).
9.
TALCOTT
PARSONS,THE SYSTEMOF MODERNSOCIETIES10 (1971).
10.
NIKLAS LUHMANN,SOZIALE SYSTEME: GRUNDRIDEINER ALLGEMEINEN
THEORIE
passim (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1984).
11.
JURGENHABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT
UND GELTUNG196 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp
1992).
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politics with other specialized sectors of society. Therefore, they
participate simultaneously in the world of politics and in their
specialized fields within society. The result is that intermediary
associations have multiple memberships in different worlds of
meaning, with their internal grammar reflecting the often
contradictory claims of different discourses. Thus, the legal
rules governing their public status as well as those governing
their internal democratic processes need to be reformulated in
light of the contradictory claims of these different discourses,
instead of merely in light of the claims of their members and
politics at large.12
But how do intermediary organizations reflect Taylor's
suggestion of a new balance between the M-stream and Lstream models? To respond, we need to distinguish between the
differentiation of society in general and the internal
differentiation of politics in particular. This will enable us to
see "civil society" as a construct that combines elements of the
M-stream and L-stream models. Social differentiation in
general creates, among other things, the hiatus between the
political process and non-political spheres of society. In this
perspective we recognize the Estream. Civil society appears as
a multitude of non-political, self-regulating social discourses
with their own codes and programs, the economy being just one
of these discourses. Furthermore, intermediary associations
have the capacities of formal organizations (like political
parties and special interest groups) to participate in both
politics and sectors of civil society. It is their organizational
goal to mediate internally between the demands of civil society
and the requirements of the political process.
At the same time, the political process in particular is
internally differentiated into diverse sub-discourses: party
politics, governmental institutions (parliament, administration,
courts), and the political public (media, associations). The
"state" is no longer the formal organization of society as a
whole, but merely a self-description of politics, personifying
parts of the political process in the image of a collective
actor.13 In this perspective we recognize the M-stream. Thus,

12. Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe Schmitter, Community, Market, State-and
Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governnee-to Social Order, in
~ Z ~ V A TINTEREST
E
GOVERNMENT:
BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 22-29 (Wolfgang
Streeck & Philippe Schmitter eds., 1985).
13. N m LUHMANN, Political Theory in the Welfare State, in POLITICAL
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a multitude of intermediary associations reappears within the
political discourse as "mirroring," "representing" and "mapping"
civil society. Such associations represent the plurality of social
discourses within the political discourse. Their capacity as
intermediaries depends on their relative autonomy within
politics.
This dual perspective allows us to distinguish three idealtypical configurations of the relationship between the modern
state and interest groups: pluralism, macrocorporatism, and
polycorporatism. These configurations should not be understood
as different historical phases of social differentiation in
general, but of the internal differentiation of politics in
particular. In this development, they represent three ways of
conceiving the "public" role of "private" associations. They are
specific representations of civil society within the political
process--cognitive means of reconstructing social reality within
politics.
If these theoretical arguments make sense, then practical
policy and legal considerations of intermediate associations
need to be reoriented. The law regulating the external status
and the internal structure of intermediary associations should
no longer be primarily concerned with the relation between
associations and their individual members on the one side and
between associations and the state on the other, as the
cornunitarianism-individualism dichotomy suggests. Rather,
the law should focus on the role intermediary associations play
as mediators between different discourses in society and should
view its main task as dealing with the capacity of the political
discourse to perceive (adequately) the plurality of social
discourses.

In post-war Germany, reconstructing intermediate
associations turned out to be a dBcult task. The effort had to
steer clear of two opposite traditions. The main task was to
dismantle the authoritarian state corporatism of the fascist
period with its compulsory associations that comprehensively
organized whole sectors of society under the tight control of a
single political party.14 At the same time, it was not
THEORYIN THE WELFARESTATE 21 et seq. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1990).
14. GAETANO VARDARO,
D I R DEL
~ LAVORO E CORPORATMSMIIN EUROPA: IERI
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conceivable to return to a regime of liberal associationalism
where associations with exclusively private status needed
protection against state interference.15 In this situation,
political pluralism was a convincing concept that allowed for a
new perception of political life and provided private
associations with a public role to play. Forcefully advocated by
American political scientists,16 political pluralism gained
strong influence in West Germany. Indeed, pluralism
transformed the private status of associations into a new public
status without impairing their autonomy against the state. The
perception of the new role of private associations was to
aggregate private interests from different sectors of society into
political interests, to represent those interests in politics, to
serve as centers of political opposition, and to produce a pool of
alternative political elites.''
The new West German law also responded positively to the
messages of political pluralism. Constitutional law as well as
private law developed rules and principles that constituted a
new public status for private associations. The Grundgesetz
(GG), West Germany's new constitution, granted a mix of old
and new guarantees to associations. Article 9 (GG) guaranteed
freedom of association and freedom of collective bargaining.
Article 19, part I11 (GG) gave constitutional rights to legal
persons. And Article 21, part I1 (GG) granted constitutional
guarantees for political parties but a t the same time required a
minimum amount of intra-party democracy.
In the first post-war period, German courts and doctrine
gave these guarantees an explicitly pluralist interpretation. As
compared to the classical liberal negative freedom of
association, the courts elaborated positive constitutional
guarantees for a pluralist system of interest mediation.18 Such
a system's essential components were seen as organized in a n
unlimited number of different, voluntary, competing, nonE OGGI (Milano: Franco Angeli 1988).
15. WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT,Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der
Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen, in 1 WERKE56-233 (Stuttgart 1792).
16. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY,Tm PROCESSOF GOVERNMENT:
A STUDY OF SOCIAL
PRESSURES (1908); LIPSET, supra note 3; SEYMOURM. LIPSET ET AL., UNION
DEMOCRACY: ~ T E R N A LPOL~TICS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TYPOGRAPHICALUNION
(1956); DAVID
B. TRUMAN, TIIE GOVERNMENTALPROCESS: P O ~ I C A
(1951).
L
17. LIPSET ET AL., supra note 16, at 85 et seq.
18. Alfred Rinken in RUDOLF WASSERMANN,ALTERNATIVROMMENTAR
ZUM
GRUNDGESETZ
FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLKDEUTSCHLAND
797 et seq. (Neuwied:
Luchterhand 1984).
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hierarchical and autonomous groups. Apart from the general
guarantees of the constitution, these groups had no special
state license, state recognition or state support. They were selforganizing and not formed upon state initiative. There was no
state control over the recruitment of leaders or over interest
articulation. And they had no representational monopoly within
the social sector they represented.lg
The Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch (BGB), the German civil code,
provided only minimal requirements through mandatory rules
for an association's internal organization. In the pluralist
period, the courts applied straightforwardly the classical
principles of the law of private associations with only slight
modifications. Of central importance was the legal mechanism
of "exit control." The basic norm was contained in section 39
BGB, which guaranteed the freedom to leave private
associations at any time. Furthermore, the governing principles
of the internal order of pluralist associations were contractual
conceptions of internal relationships, permissiveness in the
internal provisions of associations, and high internal autonomy
for organizations t o "exit control" through the membership
market.20 The guiding idea was to maintain a free
membership market in different spheres of society.
Similarly, the relationship between intermediary
associations and politics was supposed to be governed by
market-type mechanisms. Just as a multitude of free firms is a
virtual guarantee of economic competition, a pluralism
composed of free intermediary associations helps guarantee
competition among private associations for influence in the
political market. Legally, this competition is supported by the
incorporation of such associations as collective actors. The
fiction of the legal person provides intermediary associations
with the capacity for collective action in the political market.
Another guarantee of this competition is the right of a private
organization to freely define its own goals. Finally, the rule
system of normative conditions that regulates their recognition
i n practice comes close to the principle of free formation of
bodies corporate which is necessary for the free interplay of

19.
Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in THE NEW
CORPORATISM:
&KXAL-POLF~ICAL
STRUCTURESIN THE IBERIANWORLD 85-131 V.B.
Pike & T. Stritch eds., 1974).
20.
ALBERT 0 . HISRSCHMAN,
EXIT, VOICE,AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES
TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS,ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES(1970).
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political associations on the political market.21
After World War 11, the BGB still contained certain
repressive tendencies stemming from the discrimination of the
Kaiserreich of 1900 against political associations (such as
political parties and labor unions). To discourage their
activities, the BGB had subjected them to discriminatory rules.
For example, i t applied to political associations ill-suited
regulations from the law of partnerships and imposed upon
them tough liability rules. In reaction, political parties and
labor unions had traditionally refused to incorporate in order to
avoid administrative pressures and controls. Now, under the
Grundgesetz, a series of court decisions as well as new
legislation totally freed political associations from all
government dis~rimination.~~
Against the explicit wording of
the BGB, the courts privileged associations, particularly labor
unions, by giving them a public status and full rights of legal
persons without undergoing the normal procedures of
incorporation. In this way, the courts converted the positive
constitutional guarantees for intermediary organizations into
new rules of private law.
However, under the regime of political pluralism, the
recognition of the public status of intermediary associations
was limited, particularly in their relation to civil society. The
courts refused to recognize a n individual right of access
(Aufnahmezwang) to private associations, even if they were
intermediary organizations like labor unions, professional
organizations and political parties. Instead, the courts
permitted each organization to define the criteria of
membership and t o accept o r refuse new members according to
its own discretion. A state-granted right of access, the courts
argued, would violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of
a s s ~ c i a t i o nand
~ ~ the freedom of political parties.24 According
to the courts, freedom of association does not end as a n

See generally THOMASVORMBAUM,
DIE RECHTSF~IGKEIT
DER VEREINEIM
21.
19. JAHRHUNDERT:
EN BEITRAG
ZUR ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE
DES BGB (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot 1976).
22.
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 13, 5, 10-11,
42, 210, 215; 43, 245, 257; 50, 325, 331 et seq. (F.R.G.); Parteiengesetz 24.7.1967,
BGBl.1 (1537) (F.R.G.).
See G R U N D C X S[Constitution]
~
[GG] art. 9 (F.R.G.).
23.
24. See GRUNDGE~ETZ
[Constitution] [GG] art. 21, pt. I, 5 2 (F.R.G.);
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 101, 193 et seq.
(F.R.G.) for political parties.
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individual right with the founding of an association. Rather,
the right continues as a collective right of "the legitimate
organs of the association to decide in their own responsibility
and without any state interference . . . the question [ofl who
shall be accepted as a new member."25 Under this pluralist
regime, the mediation between politics and social discourses
remained a matter of private initiative and was not regulated
by the political process.
At the same time, the courts upheld a high degree of group
autonomy against state and court interference with the
associations' internal affairs.26In this respect, the courts once
again considered public status irrelevant. In those days, they
explicitly refused to apply different rules to associations
holding a monopoly or a special position of social power.27The
courts recognized a n extended associational autonomy not only
for private clubs but also for intermediate organizations. Thus,
the courts interfered with disciplinary action only in very
narrow circumstances. The normative basis of any such
interference was section 826 BGB (violation of boni mores).The
courts would only interfere with a n association's internal
affairs if it "act[ed] against the law or against boni mores or
violat[edl blatantly equity."28 Against the growing opposition
of legal doctrine, German courts refused to scrutinize cases of
disciplinary action for many years. Even in cases involving the
expulsion of members, they were not willing to test the truth of
the associations' factual bases. In fact, the courts granted
judicial review only to answer two narrow questions: Did the
expulsion have a formal basis in the constitution? Were some
minimal requirements of due process met?29
This type of organizational law may be termed "neutral
formal law," which ideally meets the conditions of privateness,
conditionality, formality and general it^.^' State control is used
in a very indirect sense-only to the extent that the law
25. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 101, 193 et
seq. (F.R.G.).
26. This has occurred since Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen
[RGZ] 49, 150 (F.R.G.).
27. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 47, 381,
384-85 (F.R.G.).
28. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 13, 5,
10-11;21, 370; 29, 354; 36, 109; 75, 158, 159;87, 337, 343 (F.R.G.).
29. BGHZ 45, 314.
30. See J ~ E NHABERMAS, ZUR REKONSTRURI~ON DES H I ~ R I S C H E N
MATERIALISMUS (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1976).
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attunes the organizational structures to a coordination between
political and social markets. The law in its social theory
assumes contractual mechanisms that are self-regulating.
These contractual mechanisms are supposed to coordinate, on
the one hand, the organizations' adaptation to the political
market where interest groups compete for influence over policy
issues. And, on the other hand, they are to balance social
interests via private definitions of purpose. This pluralist law is
founded on private autonomy and purposive rationality. It
acquires its rationality from the conceptual model of perfect
market competition. To be sure, the pluralist law does take
account of the public status of private organizations, but only
insofar as it guarantees them access to the political market and
grants them autonomy within the political process. All the rest,
especially the scope of their mediation with different sectors of
civil society and their internal adaptation to this mediation, is
left to private self-organization.
This two-fold contractual mechanism (toward politics and
toward civil society) creates an "elective affinity" of private
organization law with the ideal type of a pluralist social
structure. If pluralism is defined as transferring the liberal
market model from individual actors to groups and
organizations, then associative organizations can be seen as
competing in two markets. They act in the market for political
influence vis-8vis governmental bodies and political parties on
the one hand, and in the market of different sectors of civil
society that are competing for political representation on the
other. In summation, then, in this first, pluralist phase of West
German law, the rules of private organizations generally
tended to supply legal structures that reflected a social
pluralism.

IV. MACROCORPORATISM:
INTEGRATING
CAPITALAND LABOR INTO THE STATE
The discrepancies between a pure pluralism model and the
ugly reality of an asymmetrical pluralism with its consequences
for the law of associations do not concern us here. Instead, our
focus is on the transformation from pluralist to neocorporatist
structures that occurred in West Germany mainly in the 1960s
and 1970s. This transformation is relevant not only for political
science but also for law and legal policy. Consequently, it is
important to evaluate the doctrinal problems that social
organizations have faced as a result of this transformation, and

-
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the response of the legal regime surrounding intermediary
organizations.
There are a number of competing concepts in the
neocorporatist developmental trend. For the analytical model
chosen here, a particularly suitable one would seem to be
Philippe Schmitter's conception which splits the relationship
between pluralism and corporatism into a number of
dichotomies along different dimensions. "Social corporatism" is
defined as a
system of interest representation whose essential components
are organized in a limited number of individual compulsory
associations, not competing with each other, with a
hierarchical structure and demarcated from each other in
fbnctional respects. They have governmental recognition or
permission, if they are not indeed set up on governmental
initiatives. In the areas they represent, they are explicitly
allowed a monopoly of representation, in exchange for which
they must observe particular conditions in selecting leading
personnel and in articulating or supporting claims?'

For our discussion concerning the law of private
organizations, Schmitter's definition must be rethought in
terms of the legal relationships between associations and
sectors of civil society on the one hand, and between
associations and the political system on the other. Processes of
transition to neocorporatist interest representation can then,
generalizing, be described as a loss of nzarket mechanisms in
both of an organization's relevant environments. On the one
hand this means that competition between associations in the
market for political influence is replaced by a new symbiosis
between government agencies and big interest organizations,
mainly capital and labor, which in part move directly into
decision-making positions. On the other hand, there are
repercussions in the "membership market" of civil society. Both
changes directly impact the internal organizational structures.
Governmental institutionalization, which makes t h e
organization relatively independent v i s - h i s its members,
along with the production of public benefits, which decreases
the incentive to
cause fundamental changes in the

31. Schmitter, supra note 19, at 94-95; Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 12, at
8 et seq.
32.
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC3IVE ACTION (1965).
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relationships between members and organizations. Under
neocorporatist conditions, internal structures are increasingly
marked by the 'logic of administration." In response to
neocorporatist developments, free associations tend to become
professional, centralized, functionally differentiated and
"administratively rational" organizations. The neocorporatist
paradigm has also produced a number of other concerns.

A. Shifts in the Political Market
Political pluralism had been characterized by a multiplicity
of highly specialized interest organizations competing with each
other. The aggregation of interests emerged, as it were, external to the single association because of competition in the political market for influence. However, under neocorporatist conditions, only a few umbrella associations with claims to wideranging representation and an institutionalized monopoly of
representation arose. As a result, the aggregation of interests
had to be accomplished internally-that is, within the large
associations. The problem then became whether neocorporatist
equivalents for competition between associations could be
found.
B. Shijh in Civil Society
In pluralistic associational systems, the individual associations had still been largely dependent on the membership markets in different sectors of civil society. Entry and exit had
been the main response mechanisms through which organizational control operated. Under neocorporatist conditions, the
relative weight of those mechanisms diminished as the associations gradually became part of the government structure. Because the members' motives and an organization's goals became
increasingly independent of each other, the subtle mechanisms
of consensus and control based on the principles of free entrg
and free exit were partly deprived of their force. Intermediary
associations gained a new independence in relation to their
membership that made their responsiveness t o civil society
questionable. Thus, the issue became whether neocorporatist
substitutes for pluralist organizational controls were available
which would strengthen the associations' intermediary position
between politics and civil society.
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C. Changing Legitimation Problems
The transition from pluralistic to neocorporatist forms was
motivated essentially because the legitimation of politics versus
civil society had become problematic. The new symbiosis of big
interest organizations and governmental agencies unburdened
the latter because they could now count on support from the
organizations and on the internal enforcement of decisions in
the organizations. However, the outcome was merely a shift in
the legitimation gap. Similar legitimation problems now
emerged between associations with public status and civil society as a conflict between the membership and the leadership of
the various organizations. This presented a new challenge: the
legitimation effects of the membership market and those of the
influence market now had to be secured within the organization rather than from without.

D. Increase in Need for Integration
The mediation between social demands and government
policy in the pluralism paradigm had brought about a pressure
politics model. Private organizations had been linked with
political decision-making bodies through channels of influence.
Moreover, because of their relative autonomy, these organizations could afford to pursue their social interests rather ruthlessly. Mediations with other social interests and with governmental viewpoints had been left up to the governmental decision-making bodies. This necessarily changed as neocorporatist
organizations became involved directly in political decisions.
They now had to act responsibly-that is, to bring about a twofold integration by balancing organization policy with both governmental policies and social interests.
A parallel development could be seen in all four concerns
just discussed: a shift from external coordination between the
political and the social markets to internal political processes
within the intermediary organizations. Not surprisingly, legal
policy focused particularly on the formation of political interests within neocorporatist organizations, though often with
confusing references to "organizational democracy" (understood
as membership participation).
In the German legal policy debate over corporatist legal
regimes, the following public law concepts have been proposed
for these formerly private law areas: (1)the actions of parties
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to collective bargaining should be tied to imperative guidelines
laid down by the government, (2) the legal principles of the
beliehenen Unternehmer (private enterprises with public tasks
to which rules of public law are applied selectively) should be
extended far beyond their original range of application, (3) the
actions of associations should be brought under government
supervision, (4) checks on the legality of such actions should be
made through the courts, (5) parliamentary controls and supervision of associations through the courts of auditors should be
introduced, and (6) associations should be brought under judicial or parliamentary control by legally binding them to a "public good" clause or some other general clause. The result of
these proposals would be to convert private organizations into
public-law corporate bodies.33

The 1980s drastically altered the character of West Germany's macrocorporatism. The world-wide revitalization of neoliberal policies has also deeply affected the German regime of
trilateralism. Although it is true that German neo-corporatist
regimes have not been destroyed by the wave of internationalization, deregulation and de-unionization, the quality of the
corporatist regime in Germany has undergone substantial
change.34 Political scientists have observed tendencies toward
the decentralization and pluralization of the centralized trilateral corporatist arrangement between state, labor unions, and
industrial associations. As Mayntz has observed, "At least in
some areas the stable bilateral or trilateral relations of neocorporatism seem to be substituted. . . by large interorganizational networks."35
While the central importance of the German "iron triangle"
has considerably decreased, specialized political arenas increasingly have adopted corporatist arrangement^.^^ In Germany,
33. See
Gunther Teubner, Neo-korporatistische Stmtegien rechtlicher
figanisatwnssteuerung:
Staatliche
Strukturvorgaben
fir
gesellschaftliche
Vemrbeitung politischer Konflikie, 10 ZEITSCHFUIT FUR PARLAMENTSFRAGEN
469-502
(1979).
34. Wolfgang Streeck, Status and Contract: Basic Categories of a Socwlogical
Theory of Industrial Relations, in REGULATING CORPORATEGROUPSIN EUROPE 105,
135-45 @. Sugarman & G. Teubner eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 1990).
35. Renate Mayntz, Znteressenverbdinde und Gemeinwohl: Die Verbandestudie der
Bertelsmann Stifhng, in VERBiiNDE ZWISCHEN ~ L I E D E R I N T E R E S S E N UND
GEMEINWOHL32 (Renate Mayntz ed., Giitersloh: B e r t e l s m a ~StiRung 1992).
36. Marian D6hler & Philip Manow-Borgwardt, Korporatisierung als
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there are now several policy arenas in which corporatist arrangements have been firmly established. This is especially
environmental policies,3'
true for technical ~tandardization,~'
and social polivocational training:'
the health care
cys41
Kenis and Schneider attempt to give a broader interpretaThey argue that the tendencies
tion to these de~elopments.~~
toward a new "polycorporatism" are fostered by the following
underlying long-term trends which became highly visible in the
1980s: (1) the strengthening of non-state formal organizations
in different sectors of society,43 (2) the increasing
sectoralization and functional differentiation resulting in "over(3) the increased scope of state policrowded" policy maI~ing,4~
gesundheitspolitische
Strategie,
in
MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTFOR
GESELLSCHAFTS~RSCHUNG
(Kirln: Discussion Paper 9119 1991); Helena Flam, Corporate Actors: Definition, Genesis, and Interaction, in MAX-PLANcK-INSTITUTFUR
GE~ELLSCHAFTS~R~CHUNG
( K 6 h Discussion Paper 90111 1990).
37. See Josef Falke, Normungspolitik der Europdischen Gemeiwhaften zum
Schutz von Verbrnuchern und Arbeitnehmern, in 3 JAHRBUCH
ZUR STAATS UND
VERWALTUNGSWISSENSCWFT 217-46 (1987);~ N E WOLF,
R
DER AND DER TECHNIK:
GESCHICIFPE, STRUKWRELEMENTE UND FUNK!MON
DER VERRECHTLICHUNG
RECHTLICHER RISIKEN AM BEISPIEL DES ~MMISSIONSSC~S(Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag 1986).
38. See Helmut Voelzkow, et al., 'Regierung durch Verbdndd-am Besipiel der
umweltbezogenen Technikstewrung, 28 POmI.%%EVIERTEUAHRESSCHRIFT
80-100
(1987).
39. See Josef Hilbert et al., Selbstordnung der Berufsbildung: Eine FaUstudie
ttber die Evolution, Organisation und Funktion 'Privater Regierungen', in
18 (Forschungsschwerpunkt ZukunR
ARBEITSBERICHTEUND FORSCHUNGSMATERIALIEN
der Arbeit an der Universitiit Bielefeld ed., 1986); Wolfgang Streeck,
Interessenuerbtinde als Hindernis und Vollzugstr@er 6ffentlicher Politik, in
DER A R B E I T ~ A R K
UND
T - BESCH~~FTIGUNGSPOLITIR
INST~ONELIB BEDINGUNGEN
179-98 (F.Scharpf & M. Brockmann eds., F'rankfurt: Campus 1983).
40. See MARIAN DOHLER, G E S U N D H ENACH
~ ~ DER VENDE": POLICY
NETZWERKE UND ORDNUNGSPOLITISCHER Sl'RATEGIEWECHSEL IN GROSSBRITANNIEN,
DEN USA UND DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHTAND (Berlin: edition Sigma 1990);
G~RARD
G ~ E NNEOKORPORATISMUS
,
UND GESUNDHEF~SWESEN
(Baden-Baden: Nomos 1988).
41. See Rolf G. Heinze & Thomas Olk, Sozialpolitische Stewrung: Von der
ZWISCHEN
Subsidiaritiit zum Korporatismus, in GESELLSCHAFT~STEUERUNG
KORPORATISMUS
UND SUBSIDIAR~TAT162-94
Glagow ed., Bielefeld: Centaurus
1984).
42. See Patrick Kenis & Voker Schneider, Policy Networks and Pdicy Analysis:
EMPIRICALEVIDENCE
Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox, in POLICYNETWORKS:
AND TWEORETICALCONSIDERATIONS
26, 34-59 (Bernd Marin & Renate Mayntz eds.,
Frankfurt. Campus 1991).
43. See Charles Perrow, A Society of Organizations, in KULTUR UND
G E E L L s c m 3 et seq. (M. Haller et al. eds., Frankfurt: Campus 1988).
44. See J. Richardson & A.G. Jordan Overcrowded Pdicy Making: Some British
and European Reflections, 15 POLV SCI.247, 247-68 (1983).
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cy making in diverse policy arenas without the concomitant
growth of necessary control ~apacities:~(4) the decentralization and fragmentation of the state:6 and (5) the blurring of
the boundaries between the public and the private resulting in
trends of informal administrative actioa4'
Kenis and Schneider argue that these trends are causing
political overload and "governance under pressure." Increasingly unable to mobilize all necessary policy resources within its
own realm, government consequently is becoming dependent
upon the cooperation and joint resource mobilization of policy
actors outside its hierarchical control. As a result, policy networks between state and interest groups increase in importance. These policy networks should be understood as webs of
relatively stable and ongoing relationships that mobilize dispersed resources so that collective action can be orchestrated
toward the solution of a common policy problem.48
In the move from centralized macrocorporatist arrangements to the more flexible, decentralized and pluralized networks of polycorporatism, the internal differentiation of politics
seems to undergo a new change. Two contradictory tendencies
are working a t the same time. First, the Entstaatlichung (privatizing) of public policy: The state as a collective actor is receding into the background. The experience of state failure in
welfarist policies and the wave of deregulation have led to a
partial retreat of administrative bureaucracies. Second, the
Verstaatlichung (absorption into the state) of intermediary
organizations: The role of intermediary organizations no longer
consists solely of representing pluralist interests, but also of
full-fledged participation in public policy, the implementation of
state decisions, and even the autonomous self-administration of
public affairs.
The result is a new "state" of private networks. Against all
observations to the contrary, the state as the self-description of
politics does not shrink at all; rather, it expands its scope and
includes new and different collective actors. Instead of being
the collective personification of a centralized governmental
45. See Evelyn 2. Brodkin, Policy Politics: If We Can't Govern, Can We Manage?, 102 POL. SCI. Q. 571, 571-87 (1987).
46. See genemlly PATRICK
KENIS, THE SOCIALCONSTRUCTION
OF AN INDUSTRY:
A WORLDOF CHEMICAL
FIBRE (Frankfurt: Campus 1991).
47. See Jochen Hucke, Implementing Environmental Regulations in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1 POL'YSTUD. J. 130, 130-40(1982).
48. See Kenis & Schneider, supra note 42, at 36.
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hierarchy, the state is now being transformed into the selfdescription of a loose network of private and public actors. In
such a network, governmental bureaucracies, political parties
and autonomous social organizations form a loosely joined
cooperative configuration which replaces the hierarchical unity
of old state g~vernment.~'
Within this network, a new political division of power between governmental bureaucracies and private sector organizations is emerging. Governmental bureaucracies relinquish part
of their public competence while private associations give up a
part of their private autonomy.50 Thus, "private" associations
take over governmental activities which, in their view, were not
functioning well.51 But this requires a new orientation of their
activities. With this new public role for private associations, the
new objective for the legal constitution of social organizations is
to increase their responsiveness to general and public intere s t ~The
.~~
new formula is "publicly responsible self-regulation
in decentralized social systems."53
Consequently, the "network state" can only work if government is strong, not weak. Government in this regime is concerned with facilitating organizational development and institutionalizing the public status of intermediary groups. If these
associations are to work as private governments, they need to
be supplied with additional power and authority that they
could not mobilize solely on a voluntary basis. At the same
time, government is not restricted merely to delegating decision-making power to intermediary organizations. Rather, the
new governmental role is to monitor constantly and to redesign
the self-regulation of intermediaries. Thus, government retains
considerable power of direct regulation, not only as a last resort
but also as a wedible threat to the new private governments. I t

49. See generally Fritz W . Scharpf, Die Handlungsfahigkeit des Staates am
En& des Zwanzigsten Jahrhudrts, 32 POLITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFP
621-34
(1991).
50. See Wolfgang Streeck, Vielfalt und Interdependenz: Probkme intennediiirer
Organisationen in sich andenden Umwelten, 39 KiXNER ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
SOZIOLWE UM) SOZIALPSICHOLOGIE 488 (1987).
51. See Volker Ronge, Vom Verbandegesetz zur Sozialvertrdiglichkeit: Die
offentliche und verbandliche Diskusion iiber den Gemeinwohlbezug von Verbanden
in den 80er Jahren, in V E R B W E ZWISCHEN bfImLIEDERmTERESSEN UND
GEMEINWOHL
59 (R.Mayntz ed., Giitersloh: Bertelsmann StiRung 1992).
52. See Mayntz, supra note 35, at 13; Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 12, at
21.
53. See Mayntz, supra note 35, at 22.
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is only "by a combination of procedural, instead of substantive,
regulations with a credible threat of direct intervention" that
government can hold private governments a t least partially
accountable to the

VI. CONSTITUTIONALIZING
POLYCORPORATIST
ASSOCIATIONS
What are the consequences of polycorporatism for the law
of intermediary associations? And what role are the courts
playing in the new polycorporatist arrangements? Let us return
to the rainbow-coalition, our paradigmatic case in which a
union expelled some of its members because in the elections for
work councils they had challenged their union with an alternative list of candidates. In a series of decisions, the courts came
up with a solution that totally reversed traditional principles of
the law of private associations. The courts now tend to nullify
such expulsions and to reinstate the political opponents to their
former membership status. Our case illustrates how private
law is reacting to the transition from pluralist interest mediation, to neo-corporatist arrangements as well as to the recent
tendencies toward polycorporatism. It also suggests how the
courts may deal in the future with some of the legal issues
delineated at the beginning of this paper.55

A. Autonomy of Polycorporatist Associations
Against Court Interference
I n the area of the autonomy of polycorporatist associations
in relation to the courts, a dramatic change of the courts' policies has occurred. In 1983, a landmark decision finally abandoned the old tradition of associational autonomy.56 Since
then, the courts have also scrutinized the factual basis of an
association's disciplinary actions. The underlying motive for
this change was the new public status of private associations,
which has moved the review of private associations very close
to the judicial review of governmental administrative decisions.
The result is the pervasive judicial control of the administrative decisions of intermediary associations, with some narrowly
interpreted areas of secondary discretion.

54.
See Streeck & Schrnitter, supra note 12, at 26.
55.
See supra part I.
56.
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 87, 338 et
seq (F.R.G.).
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B. Constitutional Rights for Organizations
(GG art. 9, pt. 111 & art. 19, pt. III (F.R.G.))
Here as well we find a dramatic reinterpretation of the
negative effects of rights in terms of institutional guarantees
with procedural consequences. In the work council election cases, the unions claimed that their internal decision-making
processes were strongly protected by the constitutional guarantees of GG art. 9, pt. 111. If under law unions have the institutional entitlement to participate in work council elections, they
argued, then the constitution protects their right to influence
their members in the election procedure. Furthermore, the
unions argued that this protection should also cover the right
to put their members under the obligation not to appear a s
candidates on competing election lists.57
The courts, however, perceived the consequence of the
neocorporatist incorporation of labor unions into the process of
work council elections within enterprises. Accordingly, the
courts extended the institutional protection of the integrity of
the voting procedures. into the internal decision-making processes of the unions, insofar as the voting procedures are an
integral part of the election process. Thus, they applied section
20 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, which prohibits "influenc[ing]
the work council elections by threatening or inducing damages," even in relation to internal affairs of unions. As is clear,
the courts in this situation were confronted with a conflict
between the external principles of a free work council election
and the internal autonomy of labor unions. In the end, they
gave priority to the integrity of the election procedure, thereby
building on the neocorporatist integration of unions that can no
longer legitimately claim the autonomy of purely private associations.
C. Individual Rights of Membership, Judicial Review of
Internal Rule-Making, and Protections Against Expulsion
Under Polycorporatist Regime
To what extent are individual rights of membership reinterpreted under a polycorporatist regime? Should the courts

57.
UIrike Wendeling-Schrtider, AktueUe Probleme der Rechtsprechung zum
ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR
GESELLSCHAFTS-UND
Gewerkschaftsausschlu~, 19
110-11 (1990).
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT
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protect sectors of civil society by granting individual rights
against associations, including the right of access? And should
there be judicial control over the internal rule-making of associations and protection of individuals against expulsion? In principle, if a social organization exclusively represents entire sectors of social life, its public status requires it to guarantee
access to interested individuals and to protect their membership status.
Here we find the third decisive turn of the German judiciary.58 Once again, it was the historical shift in the external relations of private associations that motivated the courts to
abandon the old principle of associational freedom in the selection of its members. Neocorporatist associations have a monopoly of representation in their respective social spheres. As a
consequence of such monopoly power, the courts have curtailed
the freedom of neocorporatist associations to deny individuals
membership. However, the courts also have extended their
control beyond associations with a representative monopoly.
Now it is sufficient if they exert considerable "social power." In
fact, if an association performs a public role, then the courts
will grant individuals the right to access that association.
Should it desire to refuse someone membership, the association
must demonstrate "substantive reasons," which the courts
reserve the right t o review.59
By implication, judicial supervision of access to associations has been extended to include judicial review of the
associations' internal rule-making procedures. The internal
law-making power of private associations has long been the
center of associational autonomy and had been respected by the
courts. However, the German Federal Court no longer recognizes this autonomy for associations with a public status. Rather,
judicial control is presently necessary for those "associations
that exert considerable power in the economic or social sector.*' Theoretically, the courts employ the "good faith" standard to review an association's laws and procedures. Practically, however, they weigh the interests of an association against
the interests of its members.61
58. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 63, 282;
93, 151; 102, 265 (F.R.G.).
59. Peter Bartodiziej, Anspruck auf Mitgliedschaft in Vereinen und Verbtinden,
UNTERNEHMENSRECIFP
517-546 (1991).
20 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESELLSCHAF~S--UND
60. BGH NJW 1989, 1724.
61. See HermannJosef Bunte, Richterliche ZnhaltskontroUe von Verbandsmrmen:

574

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVEXSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

Strong judicial protection of members i n their
micropolitical activities within the union against expulsion and
other disciplinary matters follows directly from this new perception of private associations. This protection is especially
relevant in our paradigmatic case of work council elections.62
The courts themselves draw the fine line between legitimate
internal opposition and illegitimate activities which damage
the association. Currently, participation in a competing election
list is still covered by the right to internal opposition. The limits of legitimate dissent are reached when the opposition works
toward a "total c~nfrontation."~~

D. Internal Democracy in Quasi-PublicPrivate Associations:
Minimal Requirements of Law
In the work council cases, the courts went beyond the mere
protection of individual membership positions by demanding a
minimal amount of associational democracy from associations
with the institutionalized right to participate in work council
elections. They made the union's right to request election discipline contingent upon the nature of the internal procedures
governing the preselection of union candidate^.^^ Moreover,
the courts did not require internal elections in the unions.
Rather, we encounter a judicial reinterpretation of direct and
participatory democracy in terms of internal pluralism and the
public responsibility of private organizations.

VII. GEMEINWOHL~ERPFLICHTUNG:
PUBLIC
RESPONSIBILITY
OF PRIVATE
ORGANIZATIONS
These developments in judge-made law can be understood
as tendencies toward a new legal regime of polycorporatism.
The key theoretical development is a new concept of

Besprechung &r Entscheidung BGH ZIP 1989, 14, 20 ZEFPSCHRIFT FOR
GESELLSCHAFTS-UNDUNTERNEHMENSRECHT 316, 317-25 (1991); BARBARA
GRUNEWALD,
DER AUSSCHLUSS AUS GESELLSCHAFT
UND VEREIN126 et seq. ( K o h
Heymanns 1987).
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 45, 314 et
62.
seq.; 71, 126 et seq.; 87, 337 et seq.; 102, 265 (F.R.G.).
Cf Wendeling-Schroder, supra note 57, at 107, 107-130; WOLFGANG
63.
GEWERKSCHAFTSAUSSCHLUSSES
WEGEN
ZOLLNER, ZUR FRAGE DES
GEWERRsCHAFTSSCHiiDIGENDER KANDIDATuR BE1 BETRIEBSRATSWAHLEN:
Em
RECKPSGUTACHTEN
(Stuttgart: Daiber 1983).
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 45, 314 et
64.
seq.; 71, 126 et seq.; 87, 337 et seq.; 102, 265 (F.R.G.).
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associational autonomy. Classical private autonomy shielded
associations' activities against judicial intervention and d o w e d
judicial review only in the narrow case of a n open abuse of
power. Under conditions of polycorporatism, this private autonomy tends to be replaced by a new social autonomy of quasipublic associations.
Taking autonomy seriously means to rely on self-determination and at the same time on inevitable extenalization (outside control), not understood as hetero-determinationbut as a
potential outside support in situations of impossible self-help.
It would be similar to therapeutical help and to supportive
structures outside of the law.65

The private law of polycorporatism is looking to a new
balance of social autonomy of intermediary associations on the
one side, and their structural coupling to the legal system on
the other. Under a polycorporatist regime, intermediary associations take over important public decision-making powers. And
while the courts do not interfere with these powers, they do
place limits on the intermediaries' control of membership conditions and on their rule-making power. Here, one might find
elements of what Taylor calls the new balance between the L
stream and M-stream conceptions. If the idea of social autonomy is applied not only to the economic sector, but also to a
multiplicity of social disco~rses,6~
it may well become a model
for new ways in which law opens up to the dynamics of civil
society.

65.
Rudolf Wietholter, Zum Fortbildungsrecht der (richterlichen) Rechtsfortbildung.. Fragen eines lesenden Recht-Fertigungslehrers, in 3 KRITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRE~ZE~TSCH~
~ i i RG E S ~ G E B U N G
UND R E C H T S W I S S E N S C1~, 27-28
(1988).
66.
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